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Abstract
What accounts for the growth of US top income inequality? This paper pro-
poses a hierarchical redistribution hypothesis. The idea is that US firms have
systematically redistributed income to the top of the corporate hierarchy. I test
this hypothesis using a large-scale hierarchy model of the US private sector. My
method is to vary the rate that income scales with hierarchical rank within mod-
eled firms. I find that this model is able to reproduce four intercorrelated US
trends: (1) the growth of the top 1% income share; (2) the growth of the CEO
pay ratio; (3) the growth of the dividends share of national income; and (4) the
‘fattening’ of the entire income distribution tail. This result supports the hierar-
chical redistribution hypothesis. It is also consistent with the available empirical
evidence on within-firm income redistribution.
JEL Subject Codes: B5, C5; D31; D33;
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1 Introduction
There is now overwhelming evidence that US income inequality has increased
in recent decades. Interestingly, much of this inequality growth has occurred in
the tail of the income distribution. Top earners, it seems, have pulled away from
the rest of the pack (Alvaredo et al., 2013a; Atkinson and Piketty, 2010; Piketty
and Saez, 2001, 2006). But what explains this trend? There is no consensus on
this issue.
This paper proposes a hierarchical redistribution hypothesis. The idea is that
US firms have systematically redistributed income to the top of the corporate
hierarchy. What suggests that this is true? The growth of the CEO pay ratio is
one indicative trend. But there are others. In previous work (Fix, 2018b), I have
found that the power-law scaling of top incomesmight be due to hierarchical pay
within firms. If so, changes in the distribution tail might be due to changes in the
hierarchical pay structure of firms. There is also a curious correlation between
the US top 1% income share and the dividends share of national income. I think
this may also be related to firm hierarchy. In Fix (2018a), I find evidence that
individuals’ capitalist income fraction relates to hierarchical rank within firms.
This suggests that hierarchical redistribution might lead to functional income
redistribution.
My goal, in this paper, is to move beyond inductive reasoning based on sug-
gestive facts. Instead, I test if an empirically constrained hierarchy model can
reproduce the following four intercorrelated US trends:
1. The growth of the top 1% income share;
2. The growth of the CEO pay ratio;
3. The growth of the dividends share of national income;
4. The fattening of the entire income distribution tail
(as measured by a power-law exponent).
My method is to vary the rate at which income scales with hierarchical rank
within the model. I then see if the model can reproduce the above trends. The
results are conclusive. Although not tuned to do so, the US hierarchy model is
able to replicate these trends with reasonable accuracy. This result supports the
hierarchical redistribution hypothesis.
This finding has important implications for the study of income redistribu-
tion. First, firm hierarchical pay structure needs to be better studied. The results
here suggest that hierarchical redistribution has driven recent trends in top in-
come inequality. To understand this process better, we need more data. Second,
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the results suggest that limiting executive compensation could mitigate top in-
come inequality. Lastly, these results beg the question: why have US firms shifted
income towards the top? This question likely has no simple answers.
This paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews some of the existing
models of income redistribution. Section 3 outlines the US historical data that I
aim to reproduce. Section 4 discusses the US hierarchy model and the methods
used to test the hierarchical redistribution hypothesis. Section 5 reviews the
model’s results. Lastly, sections 6 and 7 discuss the significance of these results,
and outline areas for future research.
2 Theories of Increasing Income Inequality
The well-documented rise in US income inequality has led to a deluge of the-
ories seeking to explain this trend. I review only a small part of the literature
here. It is useful to separate these theories into ‘why’ and ‘how’ explanations.
‘Why’ theories look for socio-economic causes that are driving the rise in income
inequality. In contrast, ‘how’ theories focus on models that generate power-law
distributions. These generation mechanisms are then used to understand distri-
butional changes.
I begin with ‘why’ theories of increasing top income inequality. Perhaps the
most well-known is Piketty’s ‘r > g ’ hypothesis. Piketty proposes that inequality
will grow whenever the average return to capital (r) is greater than the rate
of economic growth (g) (Piketty, 2014; Piketty and Zucman, 2015). Another
hypothesis is that inequality has risen because top tax rates have declined (Hub-
mer et al., 2016; Piketty et al., 2014). Other authors propose that globalization
may be driving increases in inequality (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Haskel et al.,
2012). Yet another possibility is that there is a mismatch between the supply and
demand of skilled workers (Autor, 2014). ‘Why’ theories are important because
they seek socio-economic causes behind inequality trends. However, these the-
ories do not usually explain the specific changes in the income distribution tail.
This is what ‘how’ theories try to do.
Most ‘how’ theories of growing inequality are based on the stochastic (ran-
dom) growth of individual income. The starting point is the power-law distribu-
tion of top incomes. Over a century ago, Pareto (1897) discovered that income
distribution tails usually have a power-law form. This means that the probability
of finding an individual with income x is roughly proportional to x ↵, where ↵ is
the power-law exponent. Stochastic growth models are the most widely recog-
nized mechanism for generating a power-law distribution. Therefore, they have
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become the defacto standard for modeling changes in the income distribution
tail.
The basic mechanism of stochastic growth models was first identified by
Champernowne (1953). In this model, individual income is subjected to ran-
dom, multiplicative shocks. This means that income growth rates are random.
With a few other assumptions, the model produces a power-law distribution
of income. For a good technical review of this stochastic mechanism, see Ku-
mamoto and Kamihigashi (2018), Mitzenmacher (2004), and Newman (2005).
This type of ‘how’ theory is based on the truism that individuals’ incomes
change over time. Thus, it must be possible to explain the distribution of in-
come in terms of the dynamics of individual income. The same must be true
for changes in the distribution of income. A growing body of literature pursues
this reasoning (Benhabib et al., 2011, 2016; Gabaix et al., 2016; Jones and Kim,
2018; Nirei, 2009; Nirei and Aoki, 2016).
A problem with this approach is that it is devoid of any institutional con-
text. It deals with individuals in isolation. In the real world, individuals earn
their income by working for (or owning) institutions. I am interested in tracing
inequality trends to the changing institutional structure of society. My starting
point is H.F. Lydall’s (1959) work on firm hierarchy. Lydall showed that firm hi-
erarchy could create a power-law distribution of income. The mechanism relies
on the contrapuntal tendencies of hierarchical organization. First, employment
within firms tends to decrease exponentially with hierarchical rank. Second, in-
come tends to increase exponentially with hierarchical rank. When combined,
these two contrapuntal tendencies produce a power-law distribution of income.
Lydall’s 1959 paper was largely speculative. At the time, little was known
about the hierarchical structure of firms. However, the empirical study of firm
hierarchy has blossomed in the last two decades.1 There is now enough evidence
to explore the distributional consequences of hierarchy. Because the firm hierar-
chy data is still sparse, I use a model to fill in the empirical gaps. In Fix (2018b),
I develop a hierarchy model of the United States. This model extrapolates the
available firm-level data to simulate the hierarchical structure of the US private
sector. Without tuning it to do so, the model reproduces the power-law scaling
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of top US incomes.
To reiterate, the model suggests that firm hierarchy creates the power-law
income distribution tail. This result begs a question. Can changes in hierarchical
pay structure explain the growth of top income inequality? This is the hypothesis
that I test.
3 The Historical Evidence
My analysis of US income redistribution focuses on the suite of intercorrelated
trends shown in Figure 1. As the top 1% income share increased after 1980, the
following occurred:
1. The CEO pay ratio increased;
2. The dividends share of national income increased;
3. The tail of the income distribution got ‘fatter’ (as measured by the decline
in the power-law exponent).
I believe this evidence suggests that hierarchical redistribution within firms has
occurred. I review my reasoning below.
Let’s begin with the growth of the CEO pay ratio. First, let’s assume that
CEOs sit at the top of the corporate hierarchy. It follows that an increase in the
CEO pay ratio means that top-ranked employees have increased their relative
income. In other words, income has been redistributed towards the top brass
(and away from bottom ranks). I think this is an obvious sign of hierarchical
income redistribution.
The ‘fattening’ of the income distribution tail also hints at hierarchical redis-
tribution (note that a smaller power-law exponent indicates a ‘fatter’ tail). Why
might this be the case? A key finding in Fix (2018b) is that firm hierarchy can
create the power-law distribution of top incomes. It follows that hierarchical
redistribution could cause changes to the distribution tail.
The connection between CEO pay and income inequality has been widely dis-
cussed (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Krugman, 2005;
Mishel and Sabadish, 2012; Piketty and Saez, 2006). It is also well known that
1For case studies of firm hierarchy, see Audas et al. (2004); Baker et al. (1993); Dohmen
et al. (2004); Grund (2005); Lima (2000); Morais and Kakabadse (2014); Treble et al. (2001).
For aggregate studies of firm hierarchy, see Ariga et al. (1992); Bell and Van Reenen (2012);
Eriksson (1999); Heyman (2005); Leonard (1990); Main et al. (1993); Mueller et al. (2016);
Rajan and Wulf (2006); Tao and Chen (2009). For a meta analysis of these studies, see Fix
(2018c).
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Figure 1: Historical Income Distribution
Trends in the United States
This figure shows four intercorrelated trends in US
income distribution. Panel A shows the trend in
US inequality, as measured by the top 1% income
share. Panel B shows the trend in the CEO pay ratio.
This ratio is calculated using CEO income in the 350
largest US firms (ranked by sales), compared to the
average income of workers in the firms’ respective
industry. The shaded region indicates the range of
17 different estimates for the top 1% income share.
The line represents the median of these estimates.
Panel C shows the trend in the dividend share of na-
tional income. Panel D shows the fitted power-law
exponent for the top 1% of incomes. A smaller ex-
ponent indicates a ‘fatter’ tail. The grey region indi-
cates the range of estimates (when different series
are available). The line indicates the median esti-
mate. For sources and methods see Appendix A.
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growing top income shares correspond to a fattening of the income distribution
tail (Atkinson, 2017; Gabaix et al., 2016; Silva and Yakovenko, 2004). But there
is also a correlation between top income share and functional income. This re-
lation has not been widely discussed. As shown in Figure 1, changes in the
US dividend share of national income are strongly correlated with changes in
the top 1% income share. The correlation coefficient ranges between 0.82 and
0.90, depending on the choice of data. Is this trend also related to hierarchical
redistribution?
Evidence in Fix (2018a) suggests that it might be. The key finding here is that
capitalist income can be modeled as a gradient function of hierarchical power.
What is hierarchical power? I define it as proportional to the number of subor-
dinates under an individual’s control. Using this definition, I find evidence that
the capitalist fraction of individual income increases with hierarchical power.
This implies that hierarchical redistribution should change the capitalist share
of total income. Why? Suppose that top-ranked individuals have a greater pro-
portion of capitalist income, relative to bottom-ranked individuals. Let’s assume
that this proportion is fixed over time. If top-ranked individuals increase their
share of the pie, the capitalist share of total income should increase as well.
To summarize, the trends in Figure 1 hint at a hierarchical redistribution of
income within US firms. To test this hypothesis, I see if a hierarchy model of the
US private sector can reproduce these trends.
4 Methods
In principle, we do not need a model to test the hierarchical redistribution hy-
pothesis. If empirical data on firm hierarchy was plentiful, we could test this
hypothesis directly. Unfortunately, the available evidence on firm hierarchical
pay structure is sparse. This is a why a model is useful. A good model can ex-
trapolate the limited evidence and fill in the gaps. This allows us to investigate
the distributional consequences of hierarchy using the limited data that exists.
In Fix (2018b), I develop a hierarchy model aimed at this task. The model
extrapolates the available firm-level data to simulate the hierarchical structure
of the US private sector. Without tuning it to do so, this model reproduces the
power-law distribution of top US incomes. This model can be adapted to simu-
lated changes in the income distribution. The model contains a single parameter
that controls the rate that income increases with hierarchical rank. If we vary
this parameter, we simulate a hierarchical redistribution of income. This leads
to a very simple test of the hierarchical redistribution hypothesis. I vary the
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Figure 2: A Tripartite Division of Income Distribution
This figure illustrates the income distribution grouping scheme used by the hierarchy
model. The model allows for three sources of income dispersion. Inter-firm dispersion
consists of differences in (average) pay between firms. Within each firm, there are two
further sources of dispersion. Inter-hierarchical level dispersion consists of differences
in (average) pay between hierarchical levels, while intra-hierarchical level dispersion
consists of differences in pay within each hierarchical level.
model’s hierarchical pay-scaling parameter, and test if this reproduces the suite
of intercorrelated trends shown in Figure 1.
4.1 A Hierarchy Model of the United States
The US hierarchy model simulates the hierarchical structure of the US private
sector as it was (on average) between 1992 and 2015. The model has three
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sources of income dispersion (see Fig. 2):
Source 1: Income dispersion between hierarchical levels of each firm;
Source 2: Income dispersion within hierarchical levels of each firm;
Source 3: Income dispersion between different firms.
The model’s parameters are restricted entirely by firm-level empirical data.
I do not tune the model to macro-level data. This leads to a simulation of the
hierarchical structure of the US private sector as it was (on average) over the
last two decades. For a technical discussion of the model, see the Appendix.
To get a sense for what the US hierarchy model ‘looks’ like, Figure 3A shows
a landscape view of the model’s structure. Each pyramid represents a differ-
ent hierarchically organized firm. The size of each pyramid corresponds to the
number of employees, height represents hierarchical level, and color represents
relative income. To simulate hierarchical redistribution, I perturb this model by
varying hierarchical pay. All other parameters remain unchanged.
So far we have simulated individual income size only. In Fix (2018a), I add a
simulation of the functional income of individuals. I hypothesize that capitalist
income is a gradient function of one’s hierarchical power. I call this the ‘capitalist
gradient’ hypothesis. The impetus for this hypothesis is twofold. First, it expands
on the work of Nitzan and Bichler (2009), who propose that capitalist income
stems from institutionalized power. Second, this hypothesis seeks to address the
rise of partial ownership in firms. Who are capitalists? Where do they sit in
the corporate hierarchy? In the 19th century, capitalists mostly sat at the top of
firm hierarchies. But today, many individuals earn small amounts of capitalist
income, if only from retirement investments. Given modern partial ownership
practices, I propose that there is a gradient of ownership throughout the firm.
This means that the capitalist income fraction should increase with hierarchical
rank and power.
In Fix (2018a), I finds evidence for this hypothesis. I define hierarchical
power within a firm as proportional to the number of subordinates under an
individual’s control. I put this in formula form as:
hierarchical power= number of subordinates+ 1 (1)
The logic of this equation is that all individuals start at a baseline power of
1, indicating that they have control over themselves. Hierarchical power then
increases linearly with the number of subordinates. Using this equation I find
that the capitalist income fraction of US CEOs scales with hierarchical power. I
then generalize this relation using the hierarchy model. Using regressions on
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Figure 3: A Landscape View of the US Hierarchy Model
Panel A visualizes the US hierarchy model as a landscape of three-dimensional firms.
Each pyramid represents a single firm, with size indicating the number of employees
and height corresponding to the number of hierarchical levels. If you look closely, you
will see vertical lines corresponding to individuals. Income (relative to the median)
is indicated by color. Panel B visualizes the US ‘capitalist gradient’ model. Capitalist
income fraction is indicated by color. This visualization has 20,000 firms — a small
sample of the actual model, which uses 1 million firms.
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CEO pay data, I model the capitalist income fraction (Kfrac) of individuals as a
logarithmic function of hierarchical power (P):
Kfrac = 0.05 ln(P) (2)
The ‘capitalist gradient’ model uses this function to assign a capitalist income
fraction to each individual in the hierarchymodel. In Fix (2018a) I show that this
model reproduces key features of the US distribution of capitalist income. Figure
3B visualizes the model. High capitalist income fractions are concentrated at the
tops of large firms. However, almost everyone earns some capitalist income.
4.2 Modeling Hierarchical Redistribution
To test the hierarchical redistribution hypothesis, I perturb the hierarchy model
that is shown in Figure 3. I take this model, and vary the hierarchical pay-scaling
parameter. Figure 4 shows the effect. The horizontal axis shows hierarchical
rank. The vertical axis shows the average income of all the individuals of that
rank. For reference, average pay in the bottom rank is indexed to one. Each
data point represents a different model iteration. Colors show the average pay-
scaling parameter.
When the pay-scaling parameter is small, relative pay increases slowly with
hierarchical rank. But when the pay-scaling parameter is large, income increases
rapidly with hierarchical rank. The particular values of the pay-scaling param-
eter are not important. (For a technical explanation of what this parameter
does, see the Appendix). What matters is that changing this parameter creates
a hierarchical redistribution of income. This leads to a very simple test of the hi-
erarchical redistribution hypothesis. First, we randomly perturb the hierarchical
pay-scaling parameter. Second, we see if the results of this perturbation match
US historical trends. If the model results match, this supports the hierarchical
redistribution hypothesis.
Time Scope
I restrict the scope of analysis to the years 1965 onward. I do this for two reasons.
First, the CEO pay ratio data begins in 1965. Second, the model assumes an
unchanging firm-size distribution. From the late 1960s onward this assumption
is valid — the US firm-size distribution changed very little. But before the 1960s
the US firm-size distribution changed rapidly (Fix, 2017). This change violates
the model’s assumptions.
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Figure 4: Varying How Income Scales with Hierarchical Rank
This figure shows the results of perturbing the hierarchymodel’s hierarchical pay-scaling
parameter. The horizontal axis shows hierarchical rank (rank = 1 is the bottom of the
firm). The vertical axis shows the average income of all the individuals of that rank. For
reference, average pay in the bottom rank is indexed to one. Each data point represents
a different model iteration. Colors show the average pay-scaling parameter. Horizontal
‘jitter’ is added to increase the visibility of all data points. Note that the trend becomes
increasingly noisy for the very top hierarchical ranks. This is because individuals with
very high rank are extremely rare, so the mean encompasses relatively few individuals.
Metrics
I calculate four metrics on the model’s output. These are:
1. The top 1% income share;
2. The CEO pay ratio of the top 350 firms;
3. The dividends share of total income.
4. The power-law exponent of the top 1% of incomes;
A few assumptions are necessary to calculate the CEO pay ratio and the div-
idends share of income. The US CEO-pay-ratio data ranks firms by sales (Mishel
and Schieder, 2016). Since the hierarchy model does not simulate sales, I rank
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firms by total payroll. I do this because sales and total payroll are tightly corre-
lated (see the Appendix).
Calculating the dividend share of national income also requires assumptions.
The ‘capitalist gradient’ model predicts total capitalist income only. It does not
differentiate between interest and dividends. To model the dividend share of
national income, I assume that dividends constitute exactly half of capitalist in-
come. (Note that I define capitalist income as the sum of dividends and interest.
I exclude taxes on profit). This assumption is based on US historical evidence.
The dividends share of capitalist income oscillated around the 50% mark for
most of the 20th century. True, there have been important historical variations
in the composition of capitalist income (Nitzan and Bichler, 2009). However,
these are not included in the model.
5 Model Results
Results of my test of the hierarchical redistribution hypothesis are shown in Fig-
ure 5. Each panel shows both US empirical and model relations. As in Figure 4,
variation in the hierarchical pay-scaling parameter is indicated by color. Because
the model has no time element, I compare only the relation between intercorre-
lated trends. The top 1% share is the common x-axis in all panels.
The main finding is that the hierarchy model reproduces the empirical trends
identified in Figure 1. These include:
1. the non-linear scaling of the CEO pay ratio with top 1% income share;
2. the linear scaling of the dividends share of national income with top 1%
income share;
3. the non-linear scaling of the power-law exponent of the distribution tail
with the top 1% income share.
To be sure, the model’s results are not perfect. The model tends to underes-
timate the US top 1% income share. This causes a leftward shift in the modeled
relations (relative to the empirical relations) in Figure 5. This underestimate
may be due to the data used to restrict the model’s parameters. The hierarchy
model is heavily dependent on the Compustat database. Because Compustat
data includes only publicly traded companies, it is biased towards large firms.
This may cause the model to underestimate US inter-firm income dispersion (see
Fix, 2018b).
Another problem is that the model’s dividends versus top 1% slope is not
quite correct. This slope is heavily dependent on the function relating hierarchi-
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Figure 5: The Hierarchical Redistribution Model vs. US Data
This figure compares model results to historical trends in US income distribution. Model
results are produced by varying the hierarchical pay-scaling parameter, indicated by
color. Each colored point represents a single model iteration. US empirical data is shown
in black, with horizontal error lines indicating the range of 17 different estimates for
the top 1% income share. The point indicates the median of these estimates. Panel A
plots the CEO pay ratio against the top 1% share. Panel B plots the dividend share of
national income against the top 1% share. Panel C plots the fitted power law exponent
of the top 1% of incomes against the top 1% income share. For sources and methods,
see Appendix A.
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cal power to capitalist income fraction. While the function that I use is based on
empirical data, there is tremendous uncertainty in this relation. More empirical
research is needed to understand the source of this model discrepancy.
Discrepancies aside, it is surprising that the model reproduces most of the
historical trends. And this is accomplished by varying a single parameter that
controls hierarchical pay. This result supports the hierarchical redistribution
hypothesis.
6 Discussion
While we should always be cautious about drawing conclusions from a model,
I want to offer my thoughts on the significance of these results. The model
suggests that a single process can account for most of the intercorrelated US
trends shown in Figure 1. According to the model, US firms have systematically
redistributed income from the bottom to the top of the corporate hierarchy.
Figure 6 visualizes the model’s estimate of this transformation. On top is a
simulation of the United States in 1965. On the bottom is a simulation of the
United States in 2015. The difference between the two versions of the United
States is visible mostly at the the tops of large firms. Here we see an order of
magnitude increase in relative pay. Note that within small firms, there is little
discernible change.
This is consistent with the landmark findings of Song et al. (2016). Using a
massive dataset from the Social Security Administration, Song et al. study how
the pay structure within and between US firms has changed since 1981. They
find that there has been a substantial increase in inequality within very large
firms (those with more than 10,000 employees). In contrast, inequality within
smaller firms has increased very little.
Song et al. also measure how changes in between- and within-firm income
dispersion have affected US inequality. The results are surprising. They find a
clear distinction between the bottom 99% of individuals versus the top 1%. For
the bottom 99%, the growth of income inequality is mostly due to rising income
dispersion between firms. However, for the top 1%, rising inequality is mostly
due to rising income dispersion within firms.
This finding is consistent with the results in this paper. I find that increases in
the top 1% income share are largely due to a hierarchical redistribution within
firms. The work of Song et al. is also consistent with the findings in Fix (2018b).
Here, I find a clear division between the body and tail of the US income distri-
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Figure 6: A Visualization of US Hierarchical Income Redistribution
This figure shows the model’s representation of hierarchical income redistribution in the
United States. The top model represents the US in 1965 while the bottom represents the
US in 2015. I create these models by choosing the hierarchical pay-scaling parameter
that best matches the US CEO pay ratio, top 1% and dividend share data in the year in
question. The difference between the two models is mostly visible at the tops of large
firms as an order of magnitude increase in the pay of top-ranked individuals.
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bution. Within the body, I find that income dispersion is mostly due to income
differences between firms. However, in the distribution tail (the top 1%), I find
that income dispersion is mostly due to income differences between hierarchical
ranks.
Song et al. also find a link between stock market returns and individuals’
income rank within firms. For top-earning individuals, they find a correlation
between the growth of income and S&P 500 returns. More importantly, Song
et al. find that this correlation increases with income-rank within firms. This
is consistent with the results of Mishel and Davis (2014), who note a strong
correlation between CEO compensation and stock market returns.
All of this is consistent with the ‘capitalist gradient’ model. If individuals’
capitalist income fraction increases with hierarchical rank, the earnings of top-
ranked individuals should be correlated with stock market returns. Conversely,
the income of low-ranked individuals should show no correlation with market
returns. This raises the possibility of connecting income redistribution to capital
accumulation, something that has been theorized by Bichler and Nitzan (2016).
To summarize, the hierarchy model suggests that US firms have systemati-
cally redistributed income to the tops of their hierarchies (since 1980). Because
of the non-linear properties of hierarchy, this process has been most acute in very
large firms. Of course, the model’s success does not imply that hierarchical re-
distribution is all that has occurred. Nor does it imply that the model is correct.
To better test the hierarchical redistribution hypothesis, more data is needed.
7 Conclusions
This paper has tested a ‘hierarchical redistribution’ hypothesis. The idea is that
recent changes in US top income share are due to a hierarchical redistribution
of income within firms. A model implementing this hypothesis reproduces the
intercorrelated trends between the top 1% income share, the CEO pay ratio, the
dividend share of national income, and the power-law exponent of the income
distribution tail. This result supports the ‘hierarchal redistribution’ hypothesis.
If this finding is correct, it begs a question. Why has there been a hierarchical
redistribution of income over the last three decades? A neoclassical interpre-
tation would be that top-ranking individuals have increased their productivity
(Gabaix and Landier, 2008). But I find this explanation implausible. A more rea-
sonable explanation, offered by Piketty, is that top managers “have the power
to set their own remuneration, in some cases without limit” (2014, p. 24). If
so, it would seem that top managers have used this power to reward themselves
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lavishly. But how have they gained this power? And how does this power relate
to the wider political economy of the United States? These are questions worth
asking. There are likely no simple answers.
Appendix
Supplementary materials for this paper are available at the Open Science Frame-
work repository:
https://osf.io/mkjtz/
The supplementary materials include:
1. Raw source data;
2. R code for all analysis;
3. Hierarchy model code.
Notes: Appendix A documents the sources and methods used for US distribu-
tional data. The remainder of the Appendix discusses the technical details of the
hierarchy model. Appendix B outlines the case study data on which the model is
based. Appendix C outlines the US firm level data used to restrict model param-
eters. Appendix D outlines the model’s equations, while Appendix E outlines the
parameter restriction procedure.
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A Sources and Methods
CEO pay ratio. USCEO pay ratio data comes fromMishel and Schieder (2016).
This ratio is calculated using CEO income in the 350 largest US firms (ranked
by sales), compared to the average income of workers in the firm’s respective
industry.
Power-law exponents. Power-law exponents for the top 1% of US incomes
are estimated on binned data using the method outlined by Virkar and Clauset
(2014). I use income threshold data from theWorldWealth and IncomeDatabase
(see Table 1).
Top 1% income share. US top 1% income share data sources are shown in
Table 2.
Dividend share of national income. The dividend share of national income
is calculated using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.12. (Na-
tional Income by Type of Income).
Table 1: US Top 1% Power-Law Exponent Data Sources
Series Description Source
tfainc992j Pre-tax factor income | equal-split adults |
Threshold | Adults | constant 2015 local cur-
rency
Alvaredo et al. (2016)
tfiinc992j Fiscal income | equal-split adults | Threshold |
Adults | constant 2015 local currency
Alvaredo et al. (2016)
tfiinc992t Fiscal income | tax unit | Threshold | Adults |
constant 2015 local currency
Alvaredo et al. (2016)
tptinc992j Pre-tax national income | equal-split adults |
Threshold | Adults | constant 2015 local cur-
rency
Alvaredo et al. (2016)
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Table 2: US Top 1% Income Share Sources
Series Description Source
sfainc992j Pre-tax factor income | equal-split adults |
Share | Adults | share of total (ratio)
Alvaredo et al. (2016)
sfainc996i Pre-tax factor income | individuals | Share | 20
to 64 | share of total (ratio)
Alvaredo et al. (2016)
sfainc999i Pre-tax factor income | individuals | Share | All
Ages | share of total (ratio)
Alvaredo et al. (2016)
sfainc999t Pre-tax factor income | tax unit | Share | All
Ages | share of total (ratio)
Alvaredo et al. (2016)
sfiinc992j Fiscal income | equal-split adults | Share |
Adults | share of total (ratio)
Alvaredo et al. (2016)
sfiinc992t Fiscal income | tax unit | Share | Adults | share
of total (ratio)
Alvaredo et al. (2016)
sfiinc996i Fiscal income | individuals | Share | 20 to 64 |
share of total (ratio)
Alvaredo et al. (2016)
sfiinc999i Fiscal income | individuals | Share | All Ages |
share of total (ratio)
Alvaredo et al. (2016)
sfiinc999t Fiscal income | tax unit | Share | All Ages |
share of total (ratio)
Alvaredo et al. (2016)
sptinc992j Pre-tax national income | equal-split adults |
Share | Adults | share of total (ratio)
Alvaredo et al. (2016)
sptinc996i Pre-tax national income | individuals | Share |
20 to 64 | share of total (ratio)
Alvaredo et al. (2016)
sptinc999i Pre-tax national income | individuals | Share |
All Ages | share of total (ratio)
Alvaredo et al. (2016)
sptinc999t Pre-tax national income | tax unit | Share | All
Ages | share of total (ratio)
Alvaredo et al. (2016)
sfiinc_z_US World Top Incomes Legacy Series Alvaredo et al. (2013b)
lakner Calculated from micro data Atkinson and Lakner (2017)
piketty_book_no_kgains Legacy data from Capital in the 21st Century Piketty (2014)
piketty_book_with_kgains Legacy data from Capital in the 21st Century Piketty (2014)
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Firm Sales vs. Firm Payroll
Figure 7: Firm Sales vs. Payroll in the Compustat US Database
This figure plots normalized firm sales against normalized firm payroll for every firm-
year observation in the Compustat US database from 1950 to 2015. Each dot is a specific
firm in a specific year. To adjust for inflation, I divide sales and payroll by the database
averages in the respective year.
I use the hierarchy model to reproduce historical trends in the CEO pay ratio.
The empirical data from Mishel and Schieder (2016) uses the CEOs in the top
350 US firms ranked by sales. Since the hierarchy model does not have sales,
I calculate the CEO pay ratio by ranking firms by total payroll. Since payroll is
highly correlated with firm sales (Fig. 7), the former is a good proxy for the
latter.
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B Case-Study Firms
In this section I review the case-study evidence that informs the hierarchy model.
Table 3 summarizes the source data, while Figure 8 shows the hierarchical em-
ployment and pay structure of these firms. The firms remain anonymous, and
are named after the authors of the case-study papers. Although the exact shapes
vary, all the firms in this sample have a roughly pyramidal employment structure
and inverse pyramid pay structure.
Figure 9 dissects these trends to allow further analysis. Figure 9A shows how
the span of control (the employment ratio between adjacent ranks) changes as a
function of hierarchical level. In these firms, the span of control is not constant,
but instead tends to increase with hierarchical level. Similarly, Figure 9B shows
the ratio of mean pay between adjacent levels. Like the span of control, the pay
ratio tends to increase with hierarchical level. Lastly, Figure 9C shows income
dispersion within hierarchical ranks of each firm (measured with the Gini index).
Note that income dispersion within levels is quite low and there is no evidence
of a trend.
In addition to case-study data of single firms, several studies have reported
the aggregate hierarchical structure of a sample of firms (see Table 4 and Figure
11). The data from these firms reveals the same general trends as the case
studies. However, the aggregate data is less useful because these studies capture
only the top few hierarchical ranks within firms.
The case-study data plays a central role in the hierarchical model developed
in this paper. From the case-study evidence, I propose the following ‘stylized’
facts about firm employment and pay structure:
1. The span of control tends to increase with hierarchical level.
2. The inter-level pay ratio tends to increase with hierarchical level.
3. Intra-level income inequality is approximately constant across all hierar-
chical levels.
The case-study evidence informs the basic structure of the model, and also
some of its key parameters. The ‘shape’ of modeled firm hierarchies is deter-
mined from the fitted span-of-control trend shown in Figure 9A. Figure 10 shows
the idealized employment hierarchy that is implied by case-study data. Error
bars indicate uncertainty, calculated using the bootstrap resampling method. Pa-
rameters for intra-level income dispersion are determined from the mean of data
in Figure 9C. For a detailed discussion of the model algorithm and parameter-
fitting procedure, see Sections D and E.
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A.  Firm Hierarchical Employment Structure
B.  Firm Hierarchical Pay Structure
Figure 8: The Hierarchical ‘Shape’ of Six Different Case-Study Firms
This figure shows the hierarchical employment and pay structure of six different case-
study firms. Panel A shows the hierarchical structure of employment, while Panel B
shows the hierarchical pay structure.
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Figure 9: Analyzing the Hierarchical Structure of Case-Study Firms
This figure shows data from 7 case-study firms. Panel A shows how the span of con-
trol (the subordinate-to-superior employment ratio between adjacent levels) varies with
hierarchical level. Note the log scale on the y-axis. Panel B shows how the superior-
to-subordinate pay ratio varies with hierarchical level. In Panels A and B, the x-axis
corresponds to the upper hierarchical level in each corresponding ratio. Panel C shows
the Gini index of income inequality within each hierarchical level. Different case-study
firms are indicated by color, with names indicating the study author. Note that hori-
zontal ‘jitter’ has been introduced in all three plots in order to better visualize the data
(hierarchical level is a discrete variable). The lines in Panels A and B indicate exponen-
tial regressions, while the line in Panel C shows the average Gini index. Grey regions
correspond to the 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 3: Summary of Firm Case Studies
Source Years Country Firm Levels Span of Control Level Income
Level Income
Dispersion
Audas et al. (2004) 1992 Britain All
Baker et al. (1993) 1969-1985 United States Management
Dohmen et al. (2004) 1987-1996 Netherlands All
Grund (2005) 1995 & 1998 US and Germany All
Lima (2000) 1991-1995 Portugal All
Morais et al. (2014)⇤ 2007-2010 Undisclosed All
Treble et al. (2001) 1989-1994 Britain All
Notes: This table shows metadata for the firm case studies displayed in Fig. 9. The ‘Firm Levels’ column refers to the portion
of the firm that is included in the study. ‘Management’ indicates that only management levels were studied.
⇤For the analysis conducted in this paper I discard (as an outlier) the bottom hierarchical level in Morais and Kakabadse’s data.
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Figure 10: Idealized Firm Employment Hierarchy Implied by Case Studies
This figure shows the idealized firm hierarchy that is implied by fitting trends to case-
study data (Fig. 9A). Error bars show the uncertainty in the hierarchical shape, calcu-
lated using a bootstrap resample of case-study data.
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Figure 11: Aggregate Studies of Firm Hierarchical Structure
This figure shows data from 9 different aggregate firm studies. Most of these studies
only survey the top several hierarchical levels in each firm. Because of this, I order
hierarchical levels from the top down, where the CEO is level 0, the level below is -1, etc.
Panel A shows how the span of control (the employment ratio between adjacent levels)
relates to hierarchical level. Panel B shows how the pay ratio between adjacent levels
varies with hierarchical level. In both plots, horizontal ‘jitter’ has been introduced in
order to better visualize the data (hierarchical level is a discrete variable). Grey regions
correspond to the 95% confidence interval for regressions.
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Table 4: Summary of Firm Aggregate Studies
Source Years Number of Firms Country Firm Levels Span of Control Level Income
Ariga et al. (1992) 1981-1989 unknown Japan All
Bell et al. (2012) 2001-2010 552 United Kingdom Top 3
Eriksson (1999) 1992-1995 210 Denmark Management
Heyman (2005) 1991,1995 560 Sweden Management
Leonard (1990) 1981-1985 439 United States Top 9
Main et al. (1993) 1980–1984 200 United States Top 4
Mueller et al. (2016) 2004-2013 880 United Kingdom All
Rajan and Wulf (2006) 1986-1998 261 United States Top 2
Tao and Chen (2009) 1986-1998 8101 Taiwan Top 2
Notes: This table shows metadata for the aggregate studies displayed in Fig. 11. The ‘Firm Levels’ column refers to the portion of
the firm that is included in the study. ‘Top 2’, ‘Top 3’, etc. indicates that only the top n levels were included in the study (where the
top level is the CEO).
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C Compustat Data
This paper makes extensive use of the Compustat and Execucomp databases.
Compustat contains data for most publicly traded US companies, while Exe-
cucomp contains data for executive compensation. Three key statistics used
throughout this paper are calculated from this data: firm mean income, the CEO-
to-average-employee pay ratio, and the capitalist income fraction of executives. I
discuss the data and methods used for these calculations in the following sec-
tions.
C.1 Firm Mean Income
Firm mean income is calculated by dividing total staff expenses (Compustat Se-
ries XLR) by total employment (Compustat Series EMP):
Firm Mean Income=
Total Staff Expenses
Total Employment
(3)
C.2 CEO Pay Ratio
Throughout this paper, I use the term ‘CEO’ to refer to the executive at the top of
the corporate hierarchy. I identify CEOs using the titles contained in the Execu-
comp series TITLEANN. Because titles vary greatly by company, identifying the
top executive is not always a simple task. While a manual search would be most
accurate, this is unrealistic given that the Execucomp database contains over
275 000 entries. Instead, I use the following three-step algorithm to identify the
‘CEO’:
1. Find all executives whose title contains one or more of the words in the
‘CEO Titles’ list (Table 5).
2. Of these executives, take the subset whose title does not contain any of
the words in the ‘Subordinate Titles’ list (Table 5).
3. If this search returns more than one executive per firm per year, chose
the executive with the highest pay.
After identifying the CEO (and matching CEO pay data with firm data con-
tained in the Compustat database), I calculate the CEO pay ratio using the fol-
lowing equation:
CEO Pay Ratio=
CEO Pay
Firm Mean Income
(4)
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Table 5: Titles Used to Identify the ‘CEO’
CEO Titles: Subordinate Titles
president vp
chairman v-p
CEO cfo
Chief Executive Officer vice
chmn chief finance officer
president of
coo
division
div
president-
group president
chairmain-
co-president
deputy chairman
pres.-
Chief Financial Officer
Notes: This table shows the Execucomp titles used to identify the CEO of each
company. CEOs are deemed to be those whose title contains words in the left
column, but not those in the right column. Titles such as ‘president-’ and ‘pres-
ident of’ are included in the subordinate list because they typically refer to a
president of a division with the company: i.e. ‘president of western division’ or
‘president-western hemisphere’.
CEO pay ratio and firmmean income data are collectively available for roughly
6000 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2016. I use this data to ‘tune’
my hierarchical model of the firm (see Section E) . Figure 12 shows selected
summary statistics of this dataset.
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Figure 12: Selected Statistics from the Firm Sample Used for Model Tuning
This figure shows statistics for the Compustat firm sample used to tune my hierarchical
model. Panel A shows the number of firms in the sample over time, Panel B the average
firm size, and Panel C the share of US employment held by these firms. Panel D shows
the logarithmic distribution of firm size, and Panel E shows the logarithmic distribution
of the CEO pay ratio. Panel F shows the mean CEO pay ratio of all firms over time. Panel
G shows the logarithmic distribution of normalized mean pay (mean pay divided by the
average pay of the firm sample in each year). Panel H shows the ratio of mean pay in
the Compustat sample relative to the US average (calculated from BEA Table 1.12 by
dividing the sum of employee and proprietor income by the number of workers in BEA
Table 6.8C-D. Panel I shows the Gini index of firm mean pay over time.
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D Hierarchy Model Equations
In this section, I outline the mathematics underlying my hierarchical model of
the firm. The model assumptions, outlined below, are based on the stylized facts
gleaned from the real-world firm data in section B.
1. Firms are hierarchically structured, with a span of control that increases
exponentially with hierarchical level.
2. The ratio of mean pay between adjacent hierarchical levels increases ex-
ponentially with hierarchical level.
3. Intra-hierarchical-level income is lognormally distributed and constant across
all levels.
Using these assumptions, I first develop an algorithm that describes the hi-
erarchical employment within a model firm, followed by an algorithm that de-
scribes the hierarchical pay structure.
Table 6: Notation
Symbol Definition
a span of control parameter 1
b span of control parameter 2
C CEO to average employee pay ratio
E employment
F cumulative distribution function
G Gini index of inequality
h hierarchical level
I¯ average income
µ lognormal location parameter
n number of hierarchical levels in a firm
p pay ratio between adjacent hierarchical levels
r pay-scaling parameter
s span of control
  lognormal scale parameter
T total for firm
# round down to nearest integerQ
product of a sequence of numbersP
sum of a sequence of numbers
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D.1 Generating the Employment Hierarchy
To generate the hierarchical structure of a firm, we begin by defining the span
of control (s) as the ratio of employment (E) between two consecutive hierar-
chical levels (h), where h = 1 is the bottom hierarchical level. It simplifies later
calculations if we define the span of control in level 1 as s = 1. This leads to the
following piecewise function:
sh ⌘
8<: 1 if h= 1Eh 1
Eh
if h  2 (5)
Based on our empirical findings in Section B, we assume that the span of
control is not constant; rather it increases exponentially with hierarchical level.
I model the span of control as a function of hierarchical level (sh) with a simple
exponential function, where a and b are free parameters:
sh =
(
1 if h= 1
a · ebh if h  2 (6)
As one moves up the hierarchy, employment in each consecutive level (Eh)
decreases by 1/sh. This yields Eq. 7, a recursive method for calculating Eh. Since
we want employment to be whole numbers, we round down to the nearest inte-
ger (notated by #). By repeatedly substituting Eq. 7 into itself, we can obtain a
non-recursive formula (Eq. 8). In product notation, Eq. 8 can be written as Eq.
9.
Eh =# Eh 1sh for h> 1 (7)
Eh =# E1 · 1s2 ·
1
s3
· ... · 1
sh
(8)
Eh =# E1
hY
i=1
1
si
(9)
Total employment in the whole firm (ET ) is the sum of employment in all
hierarchical levels. Defining n as the total number of hierarchical levels, we get
Eq. 10, which in summation notation, becomes Eq. 11.
ET = E1 + E2 + ...+ En (10)
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ET =
nX
h=1
Eh (11)
In practice, n is not known beforehand, so we define it using Eq. 9. We
progressively increase h until we reach a level of zero employment. The highest
level nwill be the hierarchical level directly below the first hierarchical level with
zero employment:
n= {h | Eh   1 and Eh+1 = 0} (12)
To summarize, the hierarchical employment structure of our model firm is
determined by 3 free parameters: the span of control parameters a and b, and
base-level employment E1. Code for this hierarchy generation algorithm can be
found in the C++ header files hierarchy.h and exponents.h, located in the
Supplementary Material.
D.2 Generating Hierarchical Pay
To model the hierarchical pay structure of a firm, we begin by defining the inter-
hierarchical pay-ratio (ph) as the ratio of mean income ( I¯) between adjacent
hierarchical levels. Again, it is helpful to use a piecewise function so that we
can define a pay-ratio for hierarchical level 1:
ph ⌘
8<: 1 if h= 1I¯h
I¯h 1
if h  2 (13)
Based on our empirical findings in Section B, we assume that the pay ratio
increases exponentially with hierarchical level. I model this relation with the
following function, where r is a free parameter:
ph =
(
1 if h= 1
rh if h  2 (14)
Using the same logic as with employment (shown above), the mean income
Ih in any hierarchical level is defined recursively by Eq. 15 and non-recursively
by Eq. 16.
I¯h =
I¯h 1
ph
(15)
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I¯h = I¯1
hY
i=1
pi (16)
To summarize, the hierarchical pay structure of our model firm is determined
by 2 free parameters: the pay-scaling parameter r, and mean pay in the base
level ( I¯1). Code for generating hierarchical pay can be found in the C++ header
files model.h, located in the Supplementary Material.
D.2.1 Useful Statistics
Two statistics are used repeatedly within the model: mean firm pay, and the
CEO-to-average-employee pay ratio.
Mean income for all employees ( I¯T) is equal to the average of hierarchical
level mean incomes ( I¯h) weighted by the respective hierarchical level employ-
ment (Eh):
I¯T =
nX
h=1
I¯h · EhET (17)
To calculate the CEO pay ratio, we define the CEO as the person(s) in the
top hierarchical level. Therefore, CEO pay is simply I¯n, average income in the
top hierarchical level. The CEO pay ratio (C) is then equal to CEO pay divided
by average pay:
C =
I¯n
I¯T
(18)
D.3 Adding Intra-Level Pay Dispersion
Up to this point, we havemodeled only themean incomewithin each hierarchical
level of a firm. The last step in the modeling process is to add pay dispersion
within each hierarchical level.
I assume that pay dispersion within hierarchical levels is lognormally dis-
tributed. The lognormal distribution is defined by location parameter µ and
scale parameter  . Our empirical investigation of firm case studies indicated
that pay dispersion with hierarchical levels is relatively constant (see Fig. 9C).
Given this finding, I assume identical inequality within all hierarchical levels.
This means that the lognormal scale parameter   is the same for all hierarchical
levels.
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Figure 13: Adding Intra-Level Pay Dispersion to a Model Firm
This illustrates a model firm with lognormal pay dispersion in each hierarchical level.
The model firm has a pay-scaling parameter of r = 1.2 and an intra-level Gini index
of 0.13. Panel A shows the separate distributions for each level, with mean income
indicated by a dashed vertical line. Panel B shows contribution of each hierarchical
level to the resulting income distribution for the whole firm (income density functions
are summed while weighting for their respective employment).
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In order to add dispersion within each hierarchical level, I multiply mean pay
I¯h by a lognormal random variate with an expected mean of one. Formally, this
is represented by Eq. 19. Since the mean of a lognormal distribution is equal to
eµ+
1
2 
2
, I leave it to the reader to show that a mean of one requires that µ be
defined by Eq. 20.
Ih = I¯h · lnN (µ, ) (19)
µ=  1
2
 2 (20)
Given a value for   (which is a free parameter), we can define the pay distri-
bution within any hierarchical level of a firm. This process is shown graphically
in Figure 13. Figure 13A shows the lognormal income distributions for each hier-
archical level of a 5-level firm. Figure 13B shows the size-adjusted contribution
of each hierarchical level to the overall intra-firm income distribution. Lower
levels have more members, and thus dominate the overall distribution. The
code implementing this method can be found in the C++ header file model.h,
located in the Supplementary Material.
D.4 Calculating Hierarchical Power
I define an individual’s hierarchical power as the number of subordinates (S)
under their control, plus 1:
P = S + 1 (21)
Because the hierarchy model simulates only the aggregate structure of firms
(employment by hierarchical level), hierarchical power is calculated as an av-
erage per rank. For hierarchical rank h, the average hierarchical power (P¯h) is
defined as the average number of subordinates (S¯h) plus 1:
P¯h = S¯h + 1 (22)
Each individual with rank h is assigned the average power P¯h. The average
number of subordinates S¯h is equal to the sum of employment (E) in all subor-
dinate levels, divided by employment in the level in question:
S¯h =
h 1X
i=1
Ei
Eh
(23)
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Figure 14: Calculating the Average Number of Subordinates
As an example, consider the hierarchy in Figure 14. The average number of
subordinates below each individual in hierarchal level 3 (red) would be:
S¯3 =
E1 + E2
E3
=
16+ 8
4
= 6 (24)
Therefore, these individuals would all be assigned a hierarchical power of 7.
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Table 7: Model Parameters
Parameter Definition Action Scope
↵
Firm-size distribution
exponent
Determines the skewness of the
firm-size distribution
—
a, b Span of control parameters
Determines the shape of the firm
hierarchy.
Identical for all firms.
E1
Employment in base
hierarchical level
Used to build the employment
hierarchy from the bottom up.
Determines total employment.
Specific to each firm.
r Pay-scaling parameter
Determines the rate at which mean
income (within a firm) increases by
hierarchical level.
Specific to each firm.
I¯h
Mean pay in base hierarchical
level
Sets the base level income of the
firm, which determines firm average
pay.
Specific to each firm.
 
Intra-hierarchical level pay
dispersion parameter
Determines the level of inequality
within hierarchical levels of a firm.
Identical for all firms.
E Restricting Parameters
As discussed in section D, the hierarchy model has many ‘free’ parameters. Table
7 summarizes all of the parameters used in this model. While free to take on
any value, I restrict these parameters exclusively using empirical data. In the
following sections, I outline the methods used for this restriction.
E.1 Firm-Size Distribution
Recent studies have found that firm-size distributions in the United States (Ax-
tell, 2001) and other G7 countries (Gaffeo et al., 2003) can be modeled accu-
rately with a power law. A power law has the simple form shown in Eq. 25,
where the probability of observation x is inversely proportional to x raised to
some exponent ↵:
p(x)/ 1
x↵
(25)
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Figure 15: The United States Firm-Size Distribution
This figure shows the US firm-size distribution compared to a power-law distri-
bution with exponent ↵ = 2.01 (a simulation with 15 million firms) . The US
histogram combines data for ‘employer’ firms with data for unincorporated self-
employed workers. Data for ‘employer’ firms is from the US Census Bureau, Statis-
tics of U.S. Businesses (using data for 2013). This data is augmented with Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics data for unincorporated self-employed workers (series
LNU02032185 and LNU02032192). The histogram preserves Census firm-size bins,
with self-employed data added to the first bin. The last point on the histogram con-
sists of all firms with more than 10,000 employees.
Figure 15 compares the US firm-size distribution with a power law of ex-
ponent ↵ = 2.01. Although not perfect, the fit is good enough for modeling
purposes. I assume that the firm sizes can be modeled with a discrete power-
law random variate. I model the US firm-size distribution with ↵= 2.01.
A characteristic property of power-law distributions is that as ↵ approaches
2, the mean becomes undefined. In the present context, this means that the
model can produce firm sizes that are extremely large — far beyond anything
that exists in the real world. To deal with this difficulty, I truncate the power-
law distribution at a maximum firm size of 2.3 million. This happens to be the
present size of Walmart, the largest US firm in existence.
Code for the discrete power-law random number generator can be found in
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Figure 16: Density Estimates for Span of Control Parameters
This figure shows density estimates for the parameters a and b, which together deter-
mine the ‘shape’ of the firm hierarchy. These parameters are determined from regres-
sions on firm case-study data (Fig. 9). The density functions are estimated using a
bootstrap analysis, which involves resampling (with replacement) the case study data
many times, and calculating the parameters a and b for each resample.
the C++ header file rpld.h, located in the Supplementary Material. This code
is an adaption of Collin Gillespie’s (2014) discrete power-law generator found in
the R poweRlaw package (which is, in turn, an adaption of the algorithm outline
by Clauset et al. (2009)).
E.2 Span of Control Parameters
The parameters a and b together determine the shape of firm employment hier-
archy. These parameters are estimated from an exponential regression on case
study data (Fig. 9A). The model proceeds on the assumption that these param-
eters are constant across all firms.
Because the case-study sample size is small, there is considerable uncertainty
in these values. I incorporate this uncertainty into the model using the bootstrap
method (Efron and Tibshirani, 1994), which involves repeatedly resampling the
case-study data (with replacement) and then estimating the parameters a and b
from this resample. Figure 16 shows the probability density distribution result-
ing from this bootstrap analysis. I run the model many times, each time with a
and b determined by a bootstrap resample of case-study data.
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Code implementing this bootstrap can be found in the C++ header file
boot_span.h.
E.3 Base Level Employment
Given span of control parameters a and b, each firm hierarchy is constructed
from the bottom hierarchical level up. Thus, we must know base level employ-
ment. In practice, however, we don’t know this value — instead we are given
total employment for a particular firm. While it may be possible to use the
equations in section D to define an analytic function relating total employment
to base level employment, this is beyond my mathematical abilities.
Instead, I use the model to reverse engineer the problem. I input a range of
different base employment values into equations 6, 9, and 11 and calculate total
employment for each value. The result is a discrete mapping relating base-level
employment to total employment. I then use the C++ Armadillo interpolation
function to linearly interpolate between these discrete values. This allows us
to predict base level E1, given total employment ET . Code implementing this
method can be found in the C++ header file base_fit.h, located in the Sup-
plementary Material.
E.4 Pay-Scaling Parameter
The pay-scaling ratio r determines the rate at which mean pay increases by hier-
archical level. Unlike the span of control parameters, the pay-scaling parameter
is allowed to vary between firms. But how should it vary? I restrict the variation
of this parameter in a two-step process. I first ‘tune’ the model to Compustat
data. This results in a distribution of pay-scaling parameters specific to Com-
pustat firms. I then fit this data with a parameterized distribution, from which
simulation parameters are randomly chosen.
E.4.1 Fitting Compustat Pay-Scaling Parameters
I fit the pay-scaling parameter r to Compustat firms using the CEO-to-average-
employee pay ratio (C). The first step of this process is to build the employment
hierarchy for each Compustat firm using parameters a, b, and E1 (the latter is
determined from total employment). Given this hierarchical employment struc-
ture, the CEO pay ratio in the modeled firm is uniquely determined by the pa-
rameter r. Thus, we simply choose r such that the model produces a CEO pay
ratio that is equivalent to the empirical ratio.
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Figure 17: Fitting Compustat Firms with a Pay-Scaling Parameter
This figure shows the fitted pay-scaling parameters (r) for all Compustat firms. Panel A
shows the relation between the CEO pay ratio and firm size, with the fitted pay-scaling
parameter indicated by color. The discrete changes in color (evident as vertical lines)
correspond to changes in the number of hierarchical levels within firms. The pay-scaling
parameter distribution for all firms (and years) is shown in panel B.
To solve for this r value, I use numerical optimization (the bisection method)
to minimize the error function shown in Eq. 26. Here CCompustat and Cmodel are
Compustat and modeled CEO pay ratios, respectively.
✏(r) =
   Cmodel   CCompustat   (26)
For each firm, the fitted value of r minimizes this error function. To ensure
that there are no large errors, I discard Compustat firms for which the best-fit
r parameter produces an error that is larger than ✏ = 0.01). Fitted results for
r are shown in Figure 17. Code implementing this method can be found in the
C++ header file fit_model.h, located in the Supplementary Material.
E.4.2 Generating a Pay Scaling Distribution
Once we have generated r parameters for every Compustat firm, the next step
is to fit a parameterized distribution to this data. For Compustat firms, the dis-
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B.  Modeling σE
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Figure 18: Modeling the Firm Pay-Scaling Distribution
This figure visualizes the model used to simulate firm pay-scaling parameters (r). Panel
A shows the relation between r and firm employment for Compustat firms. For the
simulation, the distribution of r is modeled with the lognormal variate r0. Panel B
shows how the lognormal scale parameter  E (defined by Eq. 31) changes with firm
size. The straight line indicates the modeled relation. Panel C shows how the modeled
dispersion of ln(r0) declines with firm size, and how this relates to Compustat r0 data.
The 2  range indicates 2 standard deviations from the mean (on log-transformed data).
Panel D shows how the distribution of r for Compustat firms compares to the simulated
distribution achieved by applying the model to the same Compustat firms.
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persion of r is approximately lognormal, and tends to decline with firm size (see
Figure 18A). I model r as a shifted function of the lognormal variate r0:
r = 1+ lnN (r0) (27)
The lognormal variate r0 is defined by location parameter µ and scale pa-
rameter  . While µ is assumed to be constant for all firms,   is a function of
firm size E:
r0(E) = lnN (r0;µ, E) (28)
I use the tuned Compustat data to solve for the parameters µ and  . We first
transform Compustat r values using Eq. 29 to get the Compustat distribution of
r0:
r0 = r   1 (29)
The best-fit value for µ is defined by taking the mean of ln(r0):
µ= ln(r0) (30)
Similarly, we can solve for the best-fit value for   by taking the standard devia-
tion of ln(r0). However, unlike µ, the value   will depend on the size range of
firms (E):
 E = SD [ ln(r0) ]E (31)
Figure 18B plots  E vs. E for logarithmically spaced size groupings of Com-
pustat firms. I model this relation using a log-linear regression. Figure 18C
shows how the modeled dispersion in r0 varies with firm size, and how this
compares to Compustat data.
Once we have fitted the parameters µ and  to the tuned Compustat data, we
can generate r values for simulated firms using equations 27 and 28. Although
the model is simple, it produces reasonably accurate results. To test this accu-
racy, we can apply the model to the same Compustat firms for which it is ‘tuned’.
For each Compustat firm, we use the method outlined above to stochastically
generate a pay-scaling value r. As Figure 18D shows, the resulting simulated
distribution of r fairly accurately reproduces the original data.
When we move from simulating Compustat firms to a real-world distribution
of firms, this model involves significant extrapolations for small firms. Why?
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The Compustat firm sample has very few observations for firms smaller than
100. And those small firms that are included in the sample are likely not repre-
sentative of the wider population, since they are small public firms. In the real
world, virtually all small firms are private. As with all extrapolations, we simply
do the best with the data that is available, while noting that better data might
render the extrapolation moot. The code implementing this model can be found
in the C++ header file r_sim.h, located in the Supplementary Material.
Varying Hierarchical Pay: When attempting to reproduce historical trends in
US income inequality, I vary the mean of the pay-scaling distribution by multi-
plying the fitted lognormal component by a random constant c:
r = 1+ c · lnN (r0) (32)
E.5 Base-Level Mean Pay
As with the pay-scaling parameter, base level mean pay varies across firms. How
should it vary? Again, I restrict the variation of this parameter in a two-step
process. I first ‘tune’ the model to Compustat data. This results in a distribution
of base pay specific to Compustat firms. I then fit this data with a parameterized
distribution, from which simulation parameters are randomly chosen.
E.5.1 Fitting Compustat Base Level Pay
Having already fitted a hierarchical pay structure to each Compustat firm (in the
process of finding r), we can use this data to estimate base pay for each firm.
To do this, we set up a ratio between base level pay ( I¯1) and firm mean pay ( I¯T)
for both the model and Compustat data:
I¯ Compustat1
I¯CompustatT
=
I¯ model1
I¯ modelT
(33)
The modeled ratio between base pay and firm mean pay ( I¯ model1 / I¯
model
T ) is
independent of the choice of base pay. This is because the modeled firm mean
pay is actually a function of base pay (see Eq. 16 and 17). If we run the model
with I¯ model1 = 1, then Eq. 33 reduces to:
I¯ Compustat1
I¯ CompustatT
=
1
I¯ modelT
(34)
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Figure 19: Modeling Firm Base Level Mean Pay
This figure shows the distribution of fitted base-level mean pay for Compustat firms. I
model this data with a gamma distribution, from which simulated firm base-level mean
pay is randomly drawn. Note that fitting the unimodal gamma distribution to the bi-
modal Compustat data means that the fit is not great. (The gamma distribution does
fit the data better than other skewed distributions such as the Weibull or lognorma).
The lower mode in the Compustat data is likely not representative of the general firm
population. This lower mode is made up almost entirely of chain restaurants, which
seem to be over-represented in this sample.
We can then rearrange Eq. 34 to solve for an estimated base pay for each
Compustat firm ( I¯ Compustat1 ):
I¯ Compustat1 =
I¯ CompustatT
I¯ modelT
(35)
Code implementing this method is found in the C++ header file fit_model.h,
located in the Supplementary Material.
E.5.2 Generating a Base Pay Distribution
Once each Compustat firm has a fitted value for base-level mean pay, we fit this
data with a parametric distribution which is then used to stochastically generate
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base-level mean pay for the simulation. Since Compustat data is comprised of
observations over multiple years, in order to aggregate this data into a single
distribution, we must account for inflation. Rather than use a price index like
the GDP deflator, I divide all firmmean pay data by the average Compustat mean
pay in the appropriate year. Since our simulation is concerned only with relative
incomes (rather than absolute incomes) no pertinent information is lost in this
process.
I model the Compustat firm base pay distribution with a gamma distribution
(Fig. 19). Note that because the Compustat data has a bimodal structure (that
I do not aim to replicate), the gamma distribution is not a particularly strong
fit. Nonetheless the gamma model closely replicates the inequality of firm base
pay (which has a Gini index of roughly 0.35). Code implementing this model
can be found in the C++ header file base_pay_sim.h (in the Supplementary
Material).
E.6 Intra-Hierarchical Level Income Dispersion
Intra-hierarchical level income dispersion is modeled with a lognormal distri-
bution, with the amount of inequality determined by the scale parameter  . I
estimate   from the case-study data shown in Figure 9C. This data uses the Gini
index as the metric for dispersion.
To estimate  , we first calculate the mean Gini index of all data (G¯). We
then use Eq. 36 to calculate the value  , which corresponds to the lognormal
scale parameter that would produce a lognormal distribution with an equivalent
Gini index. This equation is derived from the definition of the Gini index of a
lognormal distribution: G = erf( /2).
  = 2 · erf 1(G¯) (36)
The model proceeds on the assumption that   is constant for all hierarchi-
cal levels within all firms. Because the case-study sample size is small, there is
considerable uncertainty in these values. I quantify this uncertainty using the
bootstrapmethod Efron and Tibshirani (1994), which involves repeatedly resam-
pling the case-study data (with replacement) and then estimating the parameter
  from this resampled data.
Figure 20 shows the probability density distribution resulting from this boot-
strap analysis. In order to incorporate this uncertainty, I run the model many
times, with each run using a different bootstrapped value for  . Code imple-
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Figure 20: Density estimates for Intra-Hierarchical Level Pay Dispersion
Parameter  
This figure shows the distribution of the lognormal scale parameter , which determines
pay dispersion within all hierarchical levels of all firms. The distribution is calculated
using the bootstrap method.
menting this method can be found in the C++ header file boot_sigma.h, lo-
cated in the Supplementary Material.
E.7 Counterfactual Models
To isolate the distributional effects of hierarchy, I create three counterfactual
models, each with only one income-dispersion source. This is achieved as fol-
lows:
Inter-firm dispersion only: To create this model, I set the hierarchical pay-
scaling parameter (r) to 1 for all firms (removing hierarchical pay-scaling) and
set the intra-hierarchical dispersion parameter ( ) to zero (removing dispersion
within hierarchical levels).
Inter-hierarchical dispersion only: To create this model, I set base-level pay
( I¯1) in all firms to an identical constant (removing dispersion between firms),
and set the intra-hierarchical dispersion parameter ( ) to zero (removing dis-
persion within hierarchical levels).
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Intra-hierarchical dispersion only: To create this model, I set base-level pay
( I¯1) in all firms to an identical constant (removing dispersion between firms),
set the hierarchical pay-scaling parameter (r) to 1 for all firms (removing hier-
archical pay-scaling).
E.8 Summary of Model Structure
The model is implemented in C++ using a modular design. Each major task is
carried out by a separate function that is defined in a corresponding header file.
Table 8 summarizes this structure sequentially in the order that functions are
called. In each step, I briefly summarize the action that is performed, giving
reference to the section where this action is described in detail.
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Table 8: Model High-Level Structure
Step Action Reference Section Parameter(s) Header File(s)
1 Bootstrap case-study data E.2, E.6 a, b,  
boot_span.h
boot_sigma.h
2
Get Compustat base-level
employment
E.3 E1 base_fit.h
3
Fit Compustat pay-scaling
parameters
E.4.1 r fit_model.h
4
Get Compustat base-level
mean pay
E.5.1 I1 fit_model.h
5
Generate power-law firm-size
distribution
E.1 ↵ rpld.h
6
Get simulation base-level
employment
E.3 E1 base_fit.h
7
Simulate pay-scaling
parameter distribution by
fitting Compustat data
E.4.2 r r_sim.h
8
Simulate base mean pay
distribution by fitting
Compustat data
E.5.2 I1 base_pay_sim.h
9 Run hierarchy model D all model.h
Notes: Model code makes extensive use of Armadillo, an open-source C++ linear algebra library (Sanderson
and Curtin, 2016).
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